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Richard V. Burkhauser and Joseph F. Quinn
Introduction
Reports that the Social Security Trust Fund will be exhausted
sometime in the early part of the next century (Board of Trustees 1997)
reinforce the need to make retirement policy in the United States more
accommodating for those who want to work. While there is general
agreement that disincentives to work at older ages in both Social
Security and employer pension plans played an important role in the
dramatic drop in retirement age from 1945 through 1985 (see Quinn
and Burkhauser 1994a for a review of the literature), skepticism exists
over the ability of policy changes to both stop this trend and increase
work at older ages.
In this policy brief we summarize how government policy has
influenced retirement since the end of World War II, show that
reductions in some of the anti-work aspects of our retirement system in
the 1980s appear to have ended the trend toward earlier and earlier
retirement, and offer five pro-work policies which would increase work
for twenty-first century older Americans.

A History of Anti-Work Policies
Mandatory retirement at a certain age was the most visible anti-work
aspect of the United States labor market prior to 1986, when the
federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibited
such requirements for nearly all workers. But at least half of what
looked like the impact of mandatory retirement on labor force
withdrawal patterns was really due to the strong financial incentives to
1
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retire built into Social Security and many employer pension plans
(Burkhauser and Quinn 1983).
To understand the incentive structure built into Social Security and
many employer pensions, it is important to view the promise of
retirement income as an asset, a stock of wealth, that can rise or fall
depending on when the benefit is claimed. When the receipt of a
retirement benefit is delayed (e.g., by working another year), two things
happen. The bad news is that current pension income is forgone, say,
$10,000. The good news is that future annual benefits will be higher.
For Social Security, they will increase because average monthly
earnings (on which benefits are based) will rise and because Social
Security adds a delayed retirement credit to all future checks for each
year of delay past age 62. For defined benefit pension plans, benefits
are usually based on some combination of last or highest earnings and
years of service, both of which are likely to rise with continued work.
The choice a worker makes, then, is not simply between a pension
check and no pension check in a hypothetical year; rather, it is between
two streams of income, one starting immediately, with smaller annual
amounts, and another commencing later, but with higher benefits each
year. Which is more valuable— more small checks or fewer large ones?
The answer depends on whether the future annual increments are
sufficient to compensate for the pension income initially forgone. If the
increments just compensate, the pension is called actuarially fair. If the
future additions are more than sufficient, then one gains twice by
working that additional year, both through the paycheck and through
the increase in pension or Social Security wealth. But if the future
increments are worth less than the benefits forgone, then pension
wealth declines with additional work. In this case, true compensation is
less than the paycheck by the amount of the wealth loss and this
surreptious paycut discourages work.
For Social Security, this pay cut occurred at age 65, when the delayed
retirement credit— the reward for postponing receipt of retirement
benefits— dropped from about 7 percent per year of delay (as it is for
2
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those aged 62 to 64) to only 1 percent (prior to 1977) and later 3
percent (from 1977 to 1990).1 For the average worker, these rewards
for delay were less than actuarially fair, creating large Social Security
pension wealth losses and therefore strong financial incentives against
delaying Social Security benefit receipt past age 65.
Considerable research has shown that many defined-benefit pension
plans work in exactly the same way. After some age, often the earliest
age of eligibility, the present value of expected future benefits falls with
each additional year on the job. As a result, those who stay with the
firm suffer a real pay cut, since their true compensation equals their pay
check plus the net change (the decline) in their pension wealth. (See
Kotlikoff and Wise 1989 or Quinn and Burkhauser 1994a for a fuller
discussion.)
This is not to suggest that the dramatic increases in Social Security and
employer pension benefits provided to succeeding generations of older
workers since World War II constitute a “social problem.” On the
contrary, the ability to enjoy a period of retirement after a lifetime of
work is an appropriate social goal. As our country became wealthier
over the last half of the 20th century, it is not surprising that we used
part of that wealth to fund additional leisure at the end of the worklife.
What is less certain, from a public policy view, is whether our
retirement system should penalize those who wish to work past
“normal” retirement age and whether the idealized normal retirement
age established in the first half of the 20th century and achieved over
the remainder of that century is appropriate for the 21st century.

1

Those who claim Social Security benefits at age 62 (the earliest age of
eligibility for old age benefits) receive 80 percent of what their benefits
would have provided at age 65— a decrease of about 7 percent per
year. Looking forward from an age 62 base, Social Security offers a 25
percent increase in yearly benefits for those who postpone benefit
acceptance until age 65. This is approximately actuarially fair for the
average worker.
3
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Table 1 reports labor force participation rates of United States men
from 1940 to 1996 by selected individual ages. If the “normal”
retirement age of men in a society is defined as the age at which only
one-half of them remain in the labor force, then normal retirement
occurred at about age 70 in 1940 and remained so over the next
decade. It was not until the 1950s, as an increasing share of workers
became eligible for Social Security and employer pension retirement
benefits, that the normal retirement age began to drop. By 1960, half of
the men were out of the labor force by age 66, and by 1970 the normal
retirement age was 65. Over the next 15 years, labor force participation
continued to fall, and by 1985 “normal” retirement was approximately
age 62, where it has remained since.
Between 1960 (just prior to the establishment of early Social Security
benefits for men at age 62) and 1985, the labor force participation of
men aged 62 fell by over one-third, from 80 to 51 percent. The labor
force participation rates of men between ages 55 and 62 have also
fallen substantially since 1960, particularly between 1970 and 1985.
However, these declines were not as precipitous as those for men aged
62 through 64. Table 1 suggests that the downward trend in labor force
participation rates for men aged 62 and over ended in the mid-1980s.
While the labor force participation rates of men aged 55 through 61
continued to fall between 1985 and 1996, the labor force participation
rates of men at most ages above age 62 rebounded from their mid1980s troughs.
Figures 1 through 4 use more aggregated data from the Current
Population Survey to show how profoundly the trends in labor force
participation rates have changed since 1985. Figure 1 shows the labor
force participation rates of men aged 60 to 64 from 1964 through 1996,
and uses a linear time trend based on the 1964-1985 data to project
labor force participation rates from 1986 through 1996. These
projections are then contrasted with the actual participation rates from
1986 through 1996. As can be seen in Figure 1, actual labor force
participation rates since 1985 are substantially above the projected
rates. In 1996, the labor force participation rate of men aged 60 to 64
was 54 percent, only slightly below their 1985 level, while the
4
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extrapolated rate was only 40 percent. As summarized in Table 2, this
translates to a difference between actual and predicted employment of
646,000 men (2,510,000 minus 1,863,000). Figure 2 shows the same
pattern for men aged 65 to 69. Rather than falling, actual labor force
participation rates increased from 24 to over 27 percent between 1985
and 1996, more than twice the projected rate of 12 percent for 1996, a
difference of 700,000 men.
The labor force participation rates of older women show a similar
pattern over the last decade. Figure 3 shows that the projected labor
force participation rate of women aged 55 to 59 increased modestly
from about 49 to 51 percent between 1985 and 1996, reflecting the
slow growth prior to 1985, while the actual labor force participation
rate rose dramatically from 50 to about 60 percent, a difference of
534,000 women workers. For women aged 60 to 64, the projected
participation rate fell slightly from 33 to 32 percent between 1985 and
1996 (Figure 4), while the actual rate increased from 33 to 38 percent,
a difference of 324,000 women workers.
This unexpected growth in the labor force of over two million older
persons (Table 2, bottom row), was favorably influenced by the
business cycle. In the strong economic growth years from 1985 through
1989, the demand for all workers, including older workers, increased,
thus encouraging more older workers to remain in the labor force. The
recession years of 1990 and 1991 negatively affected labor demand and
labor force participation. However, during the recovery years from
1993 through 1996, overall demand for labor once again increased, as
did the labor force participation rates of older men and women.
Changes in the business cycle cannot fully explain the substantial
differences between projected and actual labor force participation rates
of older men and women since 1985. In our view, a large part of the
unexpected growth in labor force participation seen in Figures 1
through 4 was due to the willingness of older workers to work and the
willingness of firms to retain or hire them caused by the changing
policy signals being sent from Washington.

5

90.6
92.8

1950a

a

87.6
84.9
83.7
85.3
81.1
81.9

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

1996

67.5

68.9

70.5

71.0

74.0

76.9

83.9

85.9

84.7

60
85.5

64.8

62.0

67.0

66.5

69.6

73.5

80.1

81.6

82.3

61
83.6

51.5

51.3

52.5

50.9

56.8

64.4

73.8

79.8

81.2

62
80.0

45.3

43.2

45.5

44.7

52.3

58.3

69.4

77.8

79.8

63
80.4

40.6

40.3

40.9

42.2

48.8

54.2

64.4

71.5

76.8

64
77.0

33.4

33.5

31.9

30.5

35.2

39.4

49.9

56.8

71.7

65
70.0

Age

31.7

30.2

27.2

26.5

30.4

34.2

44.7

49.0

67.1

66
68.1

26.5

25.8

27.0

23.7

27.9

30.5

39.4

42.7

59.4

67
60.3

22.7

22.4

23.4

20.5

24.1

23.7

37.7

42.0

57.7

68
58.5

22.2

21.9

19.0

19.5

23.0

25.8

34.0

39.0

54.5

69
56.3

Male Labor Force Participation Rates by Age in the United States, 1940 to 1996

21.3

20.6

17.1

15.9

21.3

23.7

30.1

37.2

49.8

70
48.6

Based on adjusted U.S. Bureau of the Census labor force participation data. The adjustment is based on the ratio of CPS figures
and census figures in 1970.
Source: Labor force participation figures from 1970 to 1996 are based on unpublished data from the
Current Population Survey
(CPS).

a

91.8

1970

1960

55
93.8

Year
1940a

Table 1.

16.3

16.0

16.4

14.9

17.0

22.6

24.8

28.0

39.3

72
---

Burkhauser and Quinn

5A

Aging Studies Program Policy Brief
85

80

75

70

actual

65

60

55

50

45

40

projected

35
1964

Figure 1

1969

1974

1979

1984

1989

1994

Labor Force Participation Rates of Men Aged 60-64 in
Years 1964-1996. Source: Quinn 1997.

50
45
40
actual

35
30
25
20
15
10

projected

5
0
1964

Figure 2
6

1969

1974

1979

1984

1989

1994

Labor Force Participation Rates of Men Aged 65-69 in
Years 1964-1996. Source: Quinn 1997.

Burkhauser and Quinn
75

70

actual

65

60

55

50

45

projected

40

35

30

25
1964

1969

1974

1979

1984

1989

1994

Figure 3

Labor Force Participation Rates of Women Aged 55-59
Years in 1964-1996. Source: Quinn 1997.

Figure 4

Labor Force Participation Rates of Women Aged 60-64 in
1964-1996. Source: Quinn 1997.
7

Aging Studies Program Policy Brief

From Anti-Work to Neutral Policy
After years of encouraging older workers to leave the labor force,
government policy began to recognize the lost productivity associated
with such policies. The mandatory retirement age was increased from
65 to 70 in 1978 and then outlawed for most Americans in 1986.
More importantly, the Social Security Amendments of 1983
significantly altered the relative attractiveness of work and retirement
(see U.S. House 1992, Section 1). The amount of earnings permitted
before Social Security benefits are reduced was indexed to wage
growth, and the exempt amounts permitted were made higher for those
aged 65 to 69 than for those aged 62 to 64. In addition, the earnings
test was eliminated altogether for those aged 70 and above. Beginning
in 1990, those aged 65 to 69 had their benefits reduced by only onethird in excess of the exempted amount, rather than by the one-half that
still applies to those aged 62 to 64. In 1996, Congress dramatically
increased the exempt amount for those aged 65 to 69 to $13,500 in
1997 and eventually to $30,000 by 2002, after which it will once again
be indexed to wage growth. Furthermore, beginning in 1990, the Social
Security delayed retirement credit began increasing from 3 percent per
year of delay after age 65 and will reach 8 percent by 2010. For highincome recipients, 85 percent of Social Security benefits were made
taxable. Finally, the age of “normal” retirement was scheduled to
increase from 65 to 66 between 2003 and 2008 and from age 66 to 67
between 2021 and 2026. While the full impact of all the changes in
Social Security rules legislated in 1983 will not occur until well into the
21st century, the changes that have already occurred have contributed
to ending the long decline in work past age 62 described above.
Other factors have also contributed to this change. Recent evidence
suggests that employee pension coverage may be declining (see Reno
1993; EBRI 1997, Chapter 10) and, more importantly, that the type of
pension coverage offered by firms is changing from defined benefit to
defined contribution. Only defined benefit plans contain the strong agespecific work disincentives discussed above. Defined contribution
8
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plans are really just saving accounts with tax advantages and are by
their very nature age-neutral. The proportion of pension participants
whose primary coverage is in a defined contribution plan increased
from 13 to 30 percent between 1975 and 1985, and to 42 percent by
1993 (EBRI 1997, Table 10.2). Overall, including secondary plans, the
proportion of active participants in defined contribution plans doubled
from 26 to 52 percent between 1975 and 1993 (EBRI 1997, Table
10.2). It is these workers who have increasingly been reaching
retirement age in the 1990s.
Nonetheless, defined benefits plans still provide the bulk of pension
coverage for those currently retiring and many continue to encourage
early retirement (Wiatrowski 1990). In 1986 Congress tried to reduce
the ability of firms to encourage early retirement by requiring them to
continue pension contributions and accruals for employees who work
beyond normal retirement age. While this legislation was of some
value, firms are still able to use temporary “pension windows” to entice
older workers to leave their jobs as part of firm downsizing strategies,
and did so, especially during the recession years 1990 and 1991.

Direct Job Creation, Training Programs, and
Anti-Discrimination Programs
In addition to the changes in Social Security and employer pension
policies discussed above, Congress also established, through the Older
Americans Act of 1965, a set of programs designed to increase
employment opportunities for older workers. Title II of the Older
Americans Act established the Administration on Aging to advocate for
aging programs throughout the federal government. Title III focused on
services provided at the local level to assist the elderly. Title IV
provided funds for training, research, and demonstration projects to
enhance the skill level and service delivery of professionals working in
the field of aging. Title V was specifically targeted at communityservice employment of low-income unemployed individuals aged 65
and older. (See Bass, Quinn, and Burkhauser 1995 for a fuller
discussion of these programs.)
10
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Reducing discrimination against people because of age or disability is
an increasingly important government function. The Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 has since 1994 extended protection from
employment discrimination to people with disabilities in firms with 15
or more employees. It also requires employers to make reasonable
accommodation to workers with disabilities unless this would result in
undue hardships on the operation of business. Burkhauser, Butler, and
Kim (1995) and Burkhauser, Butler, Kim, and Weathers (1997) find
that accommodation significantly extends workers’tenure with a firm
following the onset of a disability and delays their application for Social
Security Disability Insurance benefits.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 follows the
language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in prohibiting employers
from refusing to hire, discharging, or otherwise discriminating against
individuals because of age.
As Figures 1 through 4 show, the trend toward early retirement has
ended and work has increased at older ages for both men and women.
While these phenomena have undoubtedly been part of the overall
growth in employment generated by economic expansion, they are also
the result of a movement away from anti-work policies aimed at older
persons to policies that are more work-neutral. Mandatory retirement
has virtually been eliminated and Social Security is becoming more
age-neutral, in that it will no longer penalize those who work beyond a
particular age. The earnings test has been dramatically liberalized for
those aged 65 to 69, and will in essence be eliminated for the average
worker as the delayed retirement credit becomes actuarially fair.
Removing disincentives to work or constructing incentives to work
would have no impact on the labor force participation of older persons
if they had no desire to work longer. But this is not the case. Survey
evidence suggests that many older Americans would like to work more
than they do. McNaught, Barth, and Henderson (1989) analyzed the
responses of the retirees in a 1989 Harris poll of 3,500 older
Americans. Between 14 and 25 percent of the retirees, representing 1
to 2 million people, reported that they preferred to be working and that
11
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they would be able to work if a suitable job were available. Quinn and
Burkhauser (1994b) analyzed the subsample of the same survey who
were still employed and found that a substantial minority— another
million people— expected to stop work before they really would like
to. Many more older workers preferred part-time work than had it. It is
these workers who are part of the “unexpected” older men and women
captured in Table 2.

From Neutral Policies to Pro-Work Policies
The most significant demographic force in the early part of the 21st
century will be the greying of the baby boom generation. The oldest
members of that generation born between 1946 and 1964 will reach
age 62 in 2008, only a decade from now. The baby boom generation is,
on average, better skilled, healthier, and has a longer life expectancy
than any previous generation of Americans. They clearly will be better
able to stay in the labor force and continue to be productive workers
longer than their parents did. Hence, if baby boomers leave the labor
force at the same rate as current Social Security beneficiaries, the loss
in overall United States productive capacity will be great. Policies that
encourage their retention in the labor force a few years longer will both
maintain overall productivity and reduce the burden their retirement
will put on the economy. Below are five policies that could achieve
both ends. While some would be controversial, each would increase
work at older ages, and each is deserving of legislative consideration.
1. The first and most controversial would be to return the Social
Security early retirement age to its 1961 level of age 65 as the
normal retirement age is increased to 67 or higher over the next two
decades. While raising the earliest retirement age would not be
painless and a small percentage of workers might suffer substantial
losses in economic well-being, Burkhauser, Couch, and Phillips
(1996), and Phillips (1997) show that the typical male worker
taking Social Security benefits at age 62 is physically able to
12
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continue to work or is eligible to receive an employee pension
benefit and is thus able to finance his retirement until normal Social
Security benefit age. Using the new Health and Retirement Study,
they find that men who took Social Security benefits at age 62 in the
early 1990s were about as healthy and wealthy as those who
postponed taking such benefits. The typical male early recipient (66
percent of the white males and 61 percent of the black males) was
also eligible to claim an employee pension. The typical male early
recipient (71 percent of the white males and 72 percent of the black
males) had no health condition that affected his ability to work. Few
males who took early benefits were both in poor health and
dependent on Social Security as their only source of pension income
(only 7 percent of the white males and 11 percent of the black
males).
2. Permit workers aged 65 and over to opt out of additional
Social Security contributions and forego average monthly
earnings recalculations. Currently, older workers and their
employers continue to contribute into the Social Security system.
Each pays 7.65 percent of the first $68,400 (1998) and 1.45 percent
(the Medicare component) on all earnings above that. If a complete
exit from the system is not possible, Congress could exempt a
certain amount of earnings (perhaps the first $10,000) from Social
Security contributions by both employers and employees for those
over age 65 to encourage part-time work.
3. Amend the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) to allow prorated fringe benefits (for example, a
prorated employer contribution to medical insurance) for all
part-time employees, depending on how many hours they
work. Current ERISA legislation requires employers to offer parttimers who work 1,000 or more hours per year the same full
pension coverage and other fringe benefits that full-time workers
receive. This increases the cost of hiring some part-time workers,
since the cost of fringe benefits like medical insurance is fixed
regardless of the hours worked past 1,000. Current rules encourage
13
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firms to restrict the hours of part-timers to less than the statutory
minimum. A change here would allow employers and employees to
negotiate more flexible work contracts that benefit both.
4. Reverse Medicare policy to make Medicare, rather than
employment-based health insurance, the primary source of
health care coverage for workers aged 65 and over. This change
would increase Medicare expenses— approximately $1.3 billion if
enacted in 1991 (U.S. House 1992, p. 184)— but would lower a
major barrier to the employment of older workers. Health costs are
a significant concern to employers, especially for older workers. In
the 1980s, Medicare eligibility rules were changed to make
Medicare secondary to benefits provided by the employer’s
insurance, which must meet its obligations before Medicare steps
in. This applies to workers aged 65 to 69 (since 1982), spouses of
workers aged 65 to 70 (since 1984), and individuals with
disabilities covered by firms with at least 100 workers (since 1986)
(U.S. Social Security Administration 1996, p. 103). Returning to
the original Medicare policy with regard to first payer rules would
remove this barrier. This would encourage the employment of older
workers by, in essence, subsidizing their compensation at the same
level as nonworkers.
5. Expand the Earned Income Tax Credit to include workers
aged 65 and older without qualifying children. This would make
some low-income older workers eligible for this credit and, hence,
more willing to work at lower wages. The Earned Income Tax
Credit subsidizes the labor earnings of workers with children in
low-income households. In 1996, the wage supplement was 34
percent of the first $6,160 in earnings— a maximum of $2,094 for a
household with one child. It phases out slowly as adjusted gross
income increases from $11,290 to $24,395 (U.S. House 1994, pp.
700-702). Many older workers have earnings and incomes that
would make them eligible, but do not have the dependent child
needed to qualify.
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Conclusions
After decades of discouraging older persons from working, public
policy in the United States changed course in the 1980s. As a
consequence, a post-World War II trend toward earlier retirement
among older men has been halted and perhaps even reversed. Older
Americans are clearly working much more now than the trends prior to
the mid-1980s would have predicted. Although the individual
contributions of specific policy initiatives, favorable macroeconomic
performance, and other factors have not been determined, the recent
observed changes in labor force participation patterns are entirely
consistent with the changes in mandatory retirement policy, types of
pension coverage, and Social Security incentives discussed above.
Older Americans are a tremendously productive resource in the labor
market and elsewhere. Their decisions to work or not will reflect the
financial incentives they face— the relative attractiveness of work
versus retirement, which depends, among other things, on public and
private sector pension policies. Labor demand for older workers
depends on the overall strength of the economy, but also on
government policies that influence the net cost of hiring older workers.
As life expectancies increase and as the nation ages, policies that may
have been appropriate when first initiated are becoming increasingly
outdated. This is the case with some retirement policies, many of which
have been changed to encourage (or at least not to discourage)
continued attachment to the labor market at older ages. More changes
in this direction are warranted. We have outlined several specific
proposals that would encourage additional work and that we believe
deserve serious attention.
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